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An exemplary regulatory scheme
On paper the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, which governs the controversial area
of animal experimentation, looks impressive. It appears to permit only those experiments on
animals that are absolutely necessary. In 2002 the House of Lords Select Committee on
Animals in Scientific Procedures described the Act as “the tightest system of regulation in the
world”. This article puts the Act under the microscope to examine whether it is as stringent in
its protection of animals as its wording suggests or whether its words offer a hollow promise
of protection to laboratory animals.
A licensing system
The statutory regime consists of a licensing system whereby anyone carrying out an
experimental procedure on a protected animal i.e. a non-human vertebrate, which may have
the effect of causing that animal pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm must first obtain
certain licences from the Home Secretary. A project licence must be obtained which
authorises the research and personal licences are required for each individual involved in the
animal experiments. In addition, the place in which the experiment is conducted must be
certified as a designated establishment.
The cost-benefit assessment
Section 5 of the Act incorporates a utilitarian cost-benefit assessment so that a project licence
cannot be granted unless the benefit to be derived from the experiment outweighs the costs, in
terms of animal suffering. In assessing benefit, s.5(3) sets out a list of permissible purposes,
for example, the “advancement of knowledge in biological or behavioural sciences”; but these
are sufficiently wide to encompass a whole array of purposes. The benefit to be derived from
the experiment still needs to be quantified in some way. It is not enough that the experiment
satisfies one of the permissible purposes. How does one quantify potential benefit that may or
may not be discovered in the course of scientific research? Clearly this is a very difficult test
to apply in practice and one wonders how exactly the Home Secretary assesses benefit for the
purposes of the utilitarian calculation.
Assessing the benefits
In the context of medical research Drs Greek have compiled a large list of examples of
experiments which, they submit, demonstrate that the use of the animal model is detrimental
to humans. Their book ‘Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on
Animals’ provides example after example of instances in which animal experimentation has
hindered medical progress. Not only can the animal model fail to predict the toxic effects of
drugs (for example, Zimeldine caused a paralyzing illness in humans); but reliance on the
animal model can also lead to potentially useful drugs been needlessly abandoned. Penicillin
provides a powerful illustration of this. Fleming tested penicillin on rabbits but it did not work
so he gave up his work with it. Later, in desperation, he administered penicillin to a sick
person who subsequently recovered. Fleming later admitted “How fortunate we didn’t have
these animal tests in the 1940s, for penicillin would probably never have been granted a
license, and possibly the whole field of antibiotics might never have been realised” (ATLA
1994;22:207-209). It is unlikely that the Home Secretary looks at the wider picture of the
efficacy of the animal model when assessing benefit, but rather concentrates on the specified
predicted benefits of a particular project as stated by the applicants. Nevertheless, the
utilitarian nature of this legislation begs the wider question of the extent to which the animal
model in medical research benefits (or harms?) humans and it is appropriate for those
implementing the legislation, and their lawyers, to grapple with these difficult debates.
Assessing the costs
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equation proves to be equally problematic. The Home Secretary must weigh up the adverse
effects of the experiment in terms of potential animal suffering. To this end the licence
applicant relies on a system for categorising severity of animal suffering. This classification
system is not mentioned at all in the Act, but instead is detailed in the Guidance Notes.
Severity is classified as Mild, Moderate, Substantial or Unclassified. The project as a whole is
given a severity band and this reflects the likely suffering of the average animal used in the
project. Thus it is based on the overall cumulative suffering of all the animals concerned.
Each separate protocol (procedure) within the project is given a severity limit which indicates
the maximum level of suffering that an individual animal may suffer. This represents the
worse case scenario for a single animal. The nature of the severity band of a project i.e. the
cumulative suffering of all, means that it can hide the fact that a number of substantial
procedures will be carried out on animals for the purposes of that project. The Guidance
Notes recognise this difficulty noting that, “a project containing ten mild protocols, each
involving 10,000 animals, and one substantial protocol involving fifty animals, could well be
classified as mild”. On this basis, an experiment could include acute toxicity tests on fifty
monkeys resulting in prolonged pain but nevertheless the project may only be classified as
‘mild’.
In 2004 a report by the Boyd Group and the RSPCA ‘Categorising the severity of scientific
procedures on animals’ recognised the need for a severity categorisation system but felt that
there was significant difficulties with the current system. The report highlights the difficulties
faced by applicants for licences due to the inadequate guidance provided by the Home Office
on how to decide which category to apply. It recommends that more examples and case
studies are needed to illustrate the different categories. It also suggests that the use of the
word ‘moderate’ is too comfortable a term for many of the adverse effects that it encapsulates
with the consequent risk of down playing the animal suffering involved.
Categorising severity in practice
This area of the law recently came under judicial scrutiny in the case of R (on the application
of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2007] EWHC 1964 (Admin). The case arose out of an undercover investigation
by Buav concerning experiments on marmoset monkeys at Cambridge University. The
purpose of the experiments was to research into the functioning of the human brain and
illnesses affecting it such as Parkinson’s disease. The experiments involved inducing strokes
or brain damage in the marmosets, for example, by cutting or sucking out parts of the brain or
by injecting toxins. In the applications for the project licences, these adverse effects on the
marmosets were categorised as moderate. Buav argued that these had been miscategorised
and that they should have been classified as substantial. The Guidance Notes to the Act state
that procedures are substantial if “they result in a major departure from the animal’s usual
state of health or well-being” and relates specifically to “major surgery where significant
post-operative suffering may result”. One consequence of a substantial classification is that
the procedure will then be referred to the Animal Procedures Committee, whereas a moderate
one is not. Mitting J emphasised the importance of correctly identifying the severity band of a
project so that Parliament and the general public are accurately informed about the number of
projects banded as substantial.
Mitting J examined a number of ‘moderate’ procedures in detail to decide whether they had
been wrongly classified. He observed that, “two involved general anaesthesia and a
craniotomy, cutting through the skull and turning it on a hinge of bone to expose the
meninges beneath, and resecting the meninges to expose the brain. In one protocol part of the
brain was removed by suction ablation. In another a cerebral artery was to be tied to produce
a stroke intended to affect one limb.” He noted that the effects of these surgical procedures,
following the marmosets’ recovery from anaesthesia, were such that any persistent changes in
movement or mood, or persistent epilepsy, had to be dealt with by humane killing. Mitting J
accepted that where, following surgery, an animal suffers a persistent alteration of mood or
movement, severe enough to require the animal to be killed, then this is capable of amounting
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this respect Mitting J held that the Chief Inspector had erred in law. Mitting J observed that,
“where the adverse effects of a procedure can only be controlled by killing the animal, that is
a clear indication that a higher severity limit is justified than when the adverse effects can be
controlled by analgesics”.
The availability of non-animal alternatives
Section 5(5) requires that the Home Secretary be satisfied that the purpose of the programme
“cannot be achieved satisfactorily by any other reasonably practicable method not entailing
the use of protected animals”. Therefore the availability of non-animal alternatives is an
integral part of the protection afforded to animals under the Act. The Home Secretary must
always be satisfied that the use of animal experiments is absolutely necessary in each
individual case and that there is no other ‘reasonably practicable’ alternative. It is perplexing
how this clear and stringent test did not prevent the use of animals in testing cosmetic
products for 10 years until the ban in 1997. At a time when a number of companies such as
The Body Shop, were producing cosmetics without animal testing, the Home Secretary was
still granting licences for the testing of cosmetics on animals in the UK. Why did the
availability of the alternative non-animal methods, used by the likes of The Body Shop, not
prevent the grant of licences for cosmetics testing? Do the words ‘reasonably practicable’ in
the obligation of the Home Secretary to consider methods not entailing the use of protected
animals contain a legal loophole that allows the use of alternative non-animal methods to be
ignored if other factors (perhaps company profits?) are affected?
A recent Buav report by Dr Taylor, ‘Creatures of Habit: Animals in Recreational Drug
Research’ 2007 indicates that licences are still being granted in instances where alternative
non-animal methods of research are available. This seriously challenges the efficacy of s.5(5)
to achieve what it purports to achieve, i.e., the limitation of experiments on animals to those
instances where it is absolutely necessary. In one experiment at Cambridge University rats
were used to investigate the addictive nature of cocaine (2004, Science 305:1017-1019). The
procedure involved surgically inserting a catheter into the jugular vein of the rats and
conditioning them, by the use of electric shocks to their feet, to be frightened of loud sounds.
The research discovered that the addicted rats would still seek more cocaine even when it was
associated with electric shocks. Clinical observation of human patients has already
established the addictive nature of cocaine and it is difficult to see in what way the above
experiment added to our current knowledge.
Conclusion
The stringent tests in s.5 of the Act set a high threshold of protection to laboratory animals
suggesting that only those experiments that are absolutely necessary will receive licences.
Only those experiments that offer considerable benefits (since these benefits must outweigh
the animal suffering) and where no non-animal alternatives exist will be granted a licence to
proceed. Unfortunately, on closer inspection, how the Act works in practice offers a bleaker
picture. The cost-benefit assessment, which looks so promising on paper, is difficult to
implement. The benefit is limited to the projected optimism of the researchers rather than the
wider picture of the efficacy of the animal model. The costs are difficult to quantify and the
severity classification scheme needs to be modernised. The obligation to use non-animal
alternatives appears to have little weighting in practice. The UK boasts an exemplary
regulatory system on paper but its practical implementation does not approach its potential.
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